THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA FOR RUSSIAN SOCIETY

  1. The domestic system will become even more authoritarian;
  2. Repression will increase and the forces of conservatism will very much gain the upper hand;
  3. More repression will be certain: not against the real political opposition, which has already been decimated, but against cultural figures, bloggers, apolitical civic activists, journalists, experts, and so on. The authorities will resent any wielding of 'unsanctioned' influence, whether via social media posts, songs, articles, or interviews. This process (already under way) will become widespread, routine and messy;
  4. Any disatisfaction will be crushed with redoubled strength, including when it emerges within the in-system opposition;
  5. The government will increasingly stifle public debate;
  6. More independent and creative Russians will leave elite circles;
  7. More Russians will emigrate;
  8. The state's capacity for good govenance will decrease;
  9. Tiredness and hidden protests will grow,
  10. New Western sanctions and a rise in military spending will worsen the socioeconomic situation;
  11. There will be a spike in support for protests, the radicalization of the in-system opposition (the parties which are generally cautious) and conflict within the ruling elite;
  12. A drive to increase Kremlin control will inevitably reach other areas of life as well. Current conversations about "traditional values' will grow into a full-fledged moral campaign impacting everything from employment and education to interaction with foreigners and social media;
  13. Control over elections will increase and voting at all levels will become once and for all, nothing more than plebiscite campaigns with preapproval from the Kremlin required for all candidates. This will push Russian society into a deep political depression;
  14. There will be no one prepared to seriously oppose the government. Despite the financial and economic shock, no one in Russia's business elite will publicly question the leadership. Remaining unnoticed and not giving anyone a reason to doubt your loyalty will be the best survival strategy;
  15. There will likely be some sort of forced patriotic mobilization. It will be characterized by coercion and displays of sham loyalty. The divergence between a fake system marching in lockstep and a mood of doom and gloom will quickly become a yawning chasm with all the risks risks that entails;
  16. The Kremlin's political managers will also face a reshuffle, which will likely resuly in an increased role for the security services (siloviki) in domestic politics;
  17. There will be increased isolation, closer control over the media and the Internet, and tighter control of political parties,
  18. For the security services (siloviki) and their allies, the collapse with the West, growing confrontation, and new sanctions will not be a problem: on the contrary, their positions will be strengthened and they will be gifted more opportunities to grow their power and influence;
  19. There will be a sense of national emergency, in which laws can be disregarded; the ends justify the means, and there is no space for compromise with opponents. The security services (siloviki) will have more freedom to maneuver inside Russia;
  20. Faced with financial difficulties, the government will inevitably increase the tax burden in business;
  21. The influence of a conservative, anti-liberal, and anti-Western elite will grow in decisionmaking;
  22. There will be a total political neutralization of the Communits.

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