KALININGRAD

The Baltic Sea port city of Kaliningrad, the seat of a sovereign exclave of the Russian Federation between Lithuania and Poland, in the Russian oblast (administrative region) bearing its name, has been a fortress since its founding as Konigsberg in 1255. The Soviet Union’s Red Army captured it from the Germans in April 1945 in one of the last combat operations in East Prussia. After the war, Konigsberg was renamed Kaliningrad in honor of the head of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Kalinin. As part of the August 1945 Potsdam Agreement, the city retained its fortress-like character as the leading edge of the USSR’s Baltic Military District and forward base of the Soviet Union’s Baltic Fleet from 1952 onward. The Soviet frigate Storozhevoy that mutinied and made a failed attempt to escape to Sweden in November 1975, and the Soviet S-363 submarine that famously grounded off the Swedish naval port of Karlskrona in 1981 in the “ Whiskey on the Rocks” incident were both in the Baltic Fleet.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 left Kaliningrad as a Russian island in what increasingly became a NATO sea of new alliance members that included Poland and Lithuania, and a Baltic Sea that went from being a Cold War contested body of water to a NATO lake in just a decade. As a result of initial NATO encroachment in the 1990s and accelerating under the rule of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Kaliningrad has regained its status as a fortress on the Baltic Sea, now armed with cruise missiles, surface-to-air-missile (SAM) batteries, the future submarines of the Baltic Fleet, and nuclear weapons. What then is Kaliningrad? A great Russian anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) fortress threatening safe transit of the Baltic Sea and the vulnerable Baltic States, or a lone outpost surrounded by adversaries—as was the Alamo in 1836, before the Texas revolutionaries within it were overrun?

From the 1990s through early 2016, Kaliningrad’s military forces were relatively weak but got a significant boost by 2021 with heavy and diverse armaments—missiles, warships, armored vehicles, and troops. The latter consisted of the 11th Army Corps, whose composite ground force units had a nominal strengths of 12,000 to 18,000 troops, including T-72 tanks, BTK armored personnel carriers, mobile rocket launchers, and artillery. In addition, the heavily mechanized 336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade resided in the Kaliningrad oblast, equipped with BTR armored personnel carriers, with at least one battalion capable of air assault. The aircraft in the oblast included four squadrons equipped with a mix of Su-30SM, Su-24, and Su-27 aircraft that were supported by a robust air and missile defense, including four battalions of the S-400 SAM system.

In 2022, the Baltic Fleet contained 52 surface warships, including four of the new, cruise missile-armed Steregushchiy-class corvettes, one Kilo-class submarine, and numerous support vessels. Two of the fleet’s Buyan-class corvettes mount the Kaliber land-attack cruise missile.

The land-based missile arming of Kaliningrad was extensive and included dozens of nuclear-capable Iskander (SS-26) ballistic missiles (with range of over 300 miles) and antiship Bastion-P missile system, featuring Oniks P-800 missiles (with a range of 75-210 nautical miles. A map from a 2021 Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) report on the force posture of Russia’s Western Military District shows the depth of Russia’s militarization of the oblast.

As with other elements of the Russian armed forces, the Russia-Ukraine war has taken a toll on forces originally based in Kaliningrad, as Russia has mobilized units from other regions to offset losses sustained in its invasion. Some US sources have reported that the 11th Army Corps was moved to Ukraine in spring 2022 and suffered heavy losses in combat near the city of Kharkiv in August and September. One battalion of the 336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade has been reported as deployed to Ukraine as well.

Despite the loss of these ground forces, the air, naval, and missile armament of Kaliningrad remains mostly intact. In February 2023, Dutch F-35s intercepted Russian combat aircraft from Kaliningrad near Poland and escorted them out of Polish air space. In April 2023, German and UK Typhoon fighters intercepted Russian combat aircraft over the Baltics.Russia’s Baltic Fleet also remains active with exercises late last year. Russia’s 2022 Mariner Doctrine suggests that the Russia will continue to press the boundaries of gray-zone warfare, which would certainly include the Baltic region. The Russian submarine force, arguably the most well-resourced and competent arm of the Russian Navy, remains unaffected by the Russia-Ukraine war, and while the Baltic Fleet now possesses one operational Kilo-class submarine, it could ultimately field upward of six Lada-class advanced subs. if their construction continues.

While its land-based component may be reduced significantly in numbers,  Kaliningrad retains formidable armaments with which to threaten NATO resupply of the Baltic States—and now Finland—as alliance members. Until it develops a larger submarine force, much of the Russian threat resides within air and missile components of Kaliningrad’s armament. Research on that threat, in particular from the Yet Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) suggests that Russian ground-based radars and aircraft are essential to Russian surface-to-surface command of the eastern Baltic region. Destruction of any of those parts of the Russian Federation’s Baltic reconnaissance strike complex could seriously reduce the range and effectiveness of Russian missile forces.

Despite this vulnerability to Russian missiles, NATO members Poland and Lithuania—whose territories separate Kaliningrad from Russian ally Belarus only by the 100-kilometer “Suwalki Gap”—remain vigilant against potential Russian aggression. Lithuania still refers to the Kaliningrad oblast as the ‘the biggest threat in the region” and Poland remains concerned about Russian artillery and missile attacks emanating from the Kaliningrad oblast against NATO nations. Poland recently moved a US-made HIMARS rocket battery near the Kaliningrad border demonstrating continued concern for potential Russian aggression. Poland also continues to upgrade its ground forces with new mechanized units that could threaten Kaliningrad in return. NATO has long believed that Kalingrad has been a deployment location for Russian nuclear weapons. Their continued presence further aggravates the security situation in the Baltic region.

Kaliningrad will remain of value to Russia as it is the only year-round, ice-free port of the Baltic Fleet. The weakened Russian ground-force presence in the oblast adds a degree of risk to any Russian operation in the region and reduces the local ground-based threat to Poland and Lithuania. While Russian troops might not threaten the "Suwalki Gap,” Russian aircraft, missiles, and warships based in the Kaliningrad oblast could still obstruct NATO resupply efforts. Kaliningrad, however well-armed, is still surrounded by NATO territory much as West Berlin was encircled by Soviet forces during the Cold War. Yet the specter of Russia’s use of nuclear weapons in defense of Kaliningrad may impede any major Western efforts against Russia’s Kaliningrad oblast. No doubt, NATO will continue to watch Kaliningrad and devise methods to limit its impact on the wider Baltic region.

Note

The Kaliningrad Oblast covers approximately 5,800 square miles, with a population of around one million, and its capital is the city of Kaliningrad. As an exclave, the territory shares no borders with mainland Russia and receives much of its supplies by rail via Belarus and Lithuania, although a sea route of some 600 miles connects its port to that of St. Petersburg through international waters. Kaliningrad enjoys the only Russian port free from ice year round, hosting the Baltic Fleet.

Kaliningrad is both an opportunity and a challenge for Russia. Its long-range missile capabilities could deny NATO access to the northern Baltic and its regional allies, but sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania and far from the Russian mainland, the exclave also would be hard to defend. Shutterstock

One of the main strategic assets of Kaliningrad Oblast is the port at Baltiysk, home to the main base of the Russian Baltic Fleet and the only Russian port said to be free from ice all year round.

Tactically, in the event of conflict, Russia could form a land bridge from Belarus to the Kaliningrad exclave along the so-called Suwałki Gap, severing the Baltic states, including Lithuania, from other members of the Atlantic Alliance. In this scenario, troops stationed in Lithuania as part of a German-led NATO brigade would be surrounded and cut off from Central Europe. In addition, the deployment of long-range antiaircraft, surface-to-air, and surface-to-surface missiles could deny NATO forces access to maritime and land areas in the region. 

This deterrence tactic, known as anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD), presumes the best way to prevail over an adversary, especially if it is militarily superior, is to prevent it from deploying its forces in the theater of operations. Kaliningrad’s A2/AD capability would hinder NATO’s ability to support its Baltic allies by air, sea, and land via the Suwałki Gap—challenging the alliance’s defensive strategy. 

To defend Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania under the collective defense provisions of Article 5 of its founding treaty, NATO would have to break the potential air, sea, and land blockade formed by Kaliningrad. Nevertheless, although most of Russia’s A2/AD capabilities are still based on technologies and doctrines drawn from the Soviet era, Moscow’s strategic position has markedly changed: The dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact has deprived Russia of its traditional defense in depth, exposing it on the front line to the perceived threat posed by NATO. 

For example, in Soviet times Moscow possessed air defense along its periphery, in countries such as Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic States, but the independence of these states—with the exception of Belarus—has denied Russia the possibility of concentric defensive lines. Furthermore, in the event of an armed confrontation, Russia would have difficulty defending the exclave, mainly because of its distance from the heart of the federation. In this sense, from being a thorn in NATO’s flank, Kaliningrad could turn into easy prey.

The issue of Kaliningrad should be analyzed within the context of NATO’s expansion toward Eastern Europe and the former Soviet space. For example, the Kremlin keeps the region highly militarized because it perceives the Euro-Atlantic enlargement in the region as a maneuver aimed at encircling the oblast, perhaps in the hope of subtracting it from Russia. Therefore, Moscow has continued to invest in the military buildup of Kaliningrad in the hope of halting NATO expansion in the Baltic and retaining Russian influence. On the other hand, the main functions Russia attributes to Kaliningrad are maintaining economic ties with the Atlantic Alliance and spreading its influence in the Baltic area.

Given its proximity to NATO members in Eastern Europe and the Baltic and its high degree of militarization—specifically, the deployment of Iskander missiles—Kaliningrad would be a critical region should the Russia-Ukraine conflict escalate. Since its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has frequently threatened Poland and the Baltic States with reprisals for their positions on the conflict, often flexing its muscles with military exercises in Kaliningrad and Belarus. Nonetheless, Warsaw and Vilnius were among the first European countries to offer military aid to Kyiv, deepening Moscow’s resentment. The creation of rigid opposing sides in the Baltic now seems self-evident, with the Baltic States and Poland confronting Russia (Kaliningrad) and Belarus along a “new Iron Curtain.”

From a military perspective, the geostrategic position of Kaliningrad presents opportunities and challenges for Russia. It provides an early-warning function and air-defense option in coordination with units from the mainland transiting through Belarus. In addition, the Baltic Fleet is positioned to project control over or exercise sea denial in the central Baltic Sea region and ensure access to the Gulf of Finland, with consequences not only for the Baltic States, but also for the security and freedom of maneuver of NATO members Finland and Sweden.

Because Russia does not want and cannot afford a direct confrontation with NATO, Kaliningrad’s main role in the Baltic is to deter the activities of the Atlantic Alliance in the region. Certainly, Moscow could use Kaliningrad as an instrument of pressure against Poland and Lithuania to obtain advantages and concessions—for perhaps exaggerated reasons, the Baltic States fear Russian territorial revisionism could turn to them, underestimating NATO membership’s guarantee of security. The only Baltic territory Russia might wish to control is the Suwałki Gap, to reconnect Kaliningrad to Belarus, a country that is in a union state with Moscow. Control of the corridor would keep NATO from maintaining territorial continuity between its Baltic and Central-Eastern European members.

Even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, NATO took the security threats posed by Kaliningrad Oblast seriously. Some reports noted Russia could have isolated the Baltic states or attacked Poland in the Suwałki Gap. Indeed, after the opening of Russian hostilities in Ukraine in February 2022, several analysts considered the possibility that the Kaliningrad region could become the next battleground between Russia and the West.

Nonetheless, the war in Ukraine seems to be absorbing all Russia’s efforts. Russia clearly does not possess the material capacity or will to open a second front in the Baltic. At the same time, however, Russia would never allow Kaliningrad Oblast to be taken from it, for historical, strategic, and prestige reasons. The outcome of the war in Ukraine could result in a reassessment of the future political-juridical status of Kaliningrad, closing a question that has been pending since 1945, when this relatively small rim of land became Russian..