GEORGIA, MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE AND EU INTEGRATION

Written by: Eka Tkeshelashvili (Eka Tkeshelashvili is currently the President of the Georgian Institute for Strategic Studies and a former Foreign Minister and former Deputy Prime Minister of Georgia.

The views expressed in this document are solely those of the author and may not represent AALEP’s position.

“It is reasonable to expect three EaP countries Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine to stay committed to further integration with the EU. For the process of establishing closer association with the EU to successfully withstand internal as well as external challenges, it will be essential for the EU to acknowledge their perspective of eventual membership. For EaP countries, the possibility of their EU integration would serve as a consolidating factor for strengthening the commitment of their respective political elites and societies to proceed with necessary reforms, in the face of being targeted by Russia. Further, it would enable the EU highlight the full extent of the strength of its normative power, signaling that the EU remains proactive in shaping the future of a Europe “whole and free.”

The EU’s unwillingness to grant even the possibility of eventual membership for aspiring countries demonstrates that Brussels is overestimating the attractiveness of what it can offer to partner countries, and further underestimates the level of frustration and fear of societies in the post-Soviet space, who feel stuck in limbo.

What is also needed are flexible tools that could assist partner countries in overcoming short-term challenges. As partner states need assistance to attain the benefits of the integration process as early as possible, greater focus should be placed on co-ownership of the implementation process of Association agreements (AAs) and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs).

Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine will need political, technical, and financial support, as well as an increased EU footprint in the security area. This could be reflected in the following set of actions from the side of the EU:

• Robust assistance to the state-building processes, including in the security sector, which needs to be closely linked with democracy and human rights-related aspects of internal transformations;
• Strengthened capacity of state institutions necessary for the successful implementation of AAs and especially DCFTAs;
• Support for structural reforms of selected sectors of the economy, including through state budget support mechanisms;
• Greater engagement of civil society in policymaking as well as monitoring processes related to EU integration;
• Creation of platforms for the inclusion of the business community in policymaking as well as monitoring processes related to EU integration; and
• Development of effective strategic communication policies together with partner countries, raising visibility of the progress made, as well as building a deeper understanding by local societies of the EU’s values-based underpinnings and its neighborhood policy.

 Functional Partnerships

 Broader modifications will be warranted for the conceptual as well as instrumental approaches related to the frameworks that could be designed for functional partnerships. Having a clear understanding of the broad spectrum of interests and vulnerabilities of partner countries, as well as identifying common interests that could serve as the foundation for partnerships, are critically important. It is obvious that the scale and pace of relationships will vary greatly. It will be crucial to develop custom-made approaches for each individual country with well-thought out action priorities, as well as the sequencing of their implementation. In addition, it will be important to explore the possibilities of these countries’ inclusion in possible multilateral cooperation frameworks in the neighborhood.

Local needs as well as opportunities should form the basis for such an approach, which may encourage development of the sense of co-ownership for partners as well as for the EU.

In this regard it means that what is known as the ENP blueprint of European transformation might become the “menu list” from which interested countries could choose. These options would not need to be necessary preconditions for the advancement of common interest-based partnerships with the EU. However, it would be a mistake to endow full discretion to partner countries to decide what they wish to accomplish through their partnership with the EU. Instead, definition of common goals and agreement on means of achieving them would need to be the result of joint efforts from the EU and partner countries.

With this approach, it is only realistic to assume that action plans should be less ambitious in terms of their scope, but more specific and outcome oriented. Monitoring should be focused more on the implementation and sustainability of reform efforts, rather than concentrating on their inception phase. This should culminate in the adoption of relevant reform-oriented legislation.

More flexible and better calibrated tools will be needed from the side of the EU to promote greater engagement with civil societies in partner countries. In some cases, civil society might be the only counterpart that the EU can rely on in its engagement with a given partner country. It is in the interests of the EU to invest more in the sustainability and development of pluralistic and vibrant civil societies that are either targeted by the government and/or are unable to ensure their financial sustainability without foreign assistance.

Departure from the “one size fits all” approach could allow for more flexibility in defining the neighborhood itself. “Neighbours of neighbours” can be treated as part of the neighbourhood, which could advance the cause of the relevant partnership framework. Traditional interests of the EU- trade and economic development, energy security, connectivity, migration, and counterterrorism - create ample room for vibrant partnerships in the larger concept of the neighbourhood. Central Asia could be a good example. Involvement of Central Asian countries in partnership frameworks aimed at the development of common action on issues identified above could help to increase the sustainability of positive outcomes as well as create regional dynamics for partnerships that go beyond already existing tracks of bilateral cooperation.

The EU needs to strengthen the resilience of its neighbours to withstand external challenges by supporting internal state-building processes. The primary aim for the EU should be to strengthen the confidence of its neighbours in the form of political commitment from Brussels to safeguard the partners’ common interests as well as their ability to pursue closer cooperation with the EU.

It will be important to ensure that the neighbours of the neighbours do not gain important leverage or even “veto power” over the course of the development of partnerships between the EU and its neighbours. For Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, decisions on the possibility of further integration with the EU must not be taken in light of a “Russiafirst” approach.

The new neighbourhood policy should bridge the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) toolkits as part of the overall policy for the neighbourhood. There are two main areas that need to be covered by the new instruments:

•  People-to-people activities such as conflict prevention, crisis management, post conflict actions, and confidence building at every stage of conflict/crisis management related activities.
• State and institution building activities to increase the capacity of neighbors to deal with their security-related weak spots, including common security challenges, such as terrorism and organized crime. In general, security sector reforms should be given a clear priority.

 Multilateral/Regional Cooperation

Based on the nature and scope of frameworks for functional partnerships, the EU can develop platforms for multilateral cooperation that could be more interest-based rather than circumscribed by regional geography. Multilateral cooperation would make positive developments more realistic and sustainable, since most of the neighbourhood’s problems are regional and therefore cannot be effectively addressed on a solely bilateral basis.

A functional approach to partnerships would create more opportunities for the development of platforms for regional cooperation, which would be broader than the current scope of EaP. This would align well with the extended concept of the EU neighbourhood and would facilitate the creation of platforms that might stimulate even interregional multilateral partnerships.

Should the ENP (and for that matter, the EaP) be integrally linked with the EU’s CFSP, resulting in the stronger role of the EU on conflict and security-related issues, then the chances for the EaP to gain meaningful multilateral discourse will be higher.

People-to-People Relationship

Visa facilitation and visa liberalization are some of the most effective tools for advancing the cause of the European-modeled transformations of partner countries in the neighbourhood. Instruments that could create more opportunities for education, experience sharing, and mobility for the work force would significantly advance the depth of the partnerships, as well as the transformational processes at the national and regional levels. For partners like Georgia wishing to pursue integration partnerships with the EU, visa liberalization serves a strategic purpose, even in the short term. It allows partner countries to consolidate public support, as well as to fight back against disillusionment with the EU approximation process, by delivering tangible outcomes for the local constituencies.

Visibility/Strategic Communication

A comprehensive approach to the ENP will require more emphasis on robust strategic communication. The EU needs to step up its efforts to communicate more with local societies in order to promote both greater understanding of the EU and its aims and commitments vis-à-vis the neighbourhood. Civil society and media could be used as effective mediums for this outreach; however, more direct initiatives from Brussels and Member States to increase awareness of policies and positions should be part of the process as well.