THE ICELANDIC STYLE OF PUBLIC POLICY ADVOCACY

Iceland is a northern island state with a population of 320,000 which means it is both small in terms of population and fairly isolated geographically. The banking crisis has raised some fundamental questions in Iceland about the integrity of its governing institutions and the concept of corruption as it should be understood in the Icelandic context. A recurring issue is that of the extensive personal and professional relationship networks that exist and therefore permeate the institutions of government and decision making. For parliamentarians, the issue of business links and independence, as well as conflicts of interest more generally is a live one. A reflection process has already started in this area and some tools have been developed to increase transparency, not only of parliamentary proceedings (an area in which the country has a tradition of openness), but also of the activities of its individual members, including through the introduction of a financial declaration system and the on-going development of a code of conduct. The authorities can only be encouraged to further develop the applicable rules so that they are meaningful and effective in promoting a parliamentary ethos that acknowledges and openly addresses corruption prevention, well dconflicts of interest and more generally, deontological matters, and in increasing public confidence in this sector.

Transparency in the legislative process and Public Policy Advocacy

Iceland is a republic with a parliamentary form of government . It has a unicameral Parliament, the Althingi, composed of 63 members elected by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation (d’Hondt system) for a term of four years.

In Iceland, the practice of ensuring access to the details of draft legislation to allow for comment once it has been introduced in Parliament is eveloped. In particular, draft laws proposed by the Government are often subject to consultation (in written form and via meetings with interested parties or sectors); in some cases, drafts are published in the respective Ministry’s website. All draft laws are made publicly available on the Althingi website once they are formally introduced. When a draft law has been submitted to the Althingi, the public and other interested parties can submit their opinions in writing to the relevant parliamentary committee. When discussing a draft law, committees request statements from concerned parties (e.g. Government institutions, non-governmental bodies, private entities) regarding the proposed bill. There are currently eight standing committees each comprised of nine members broadly reflecting the representation of the parties in the Althingi. Regular meetings of the standing committees are generally closed. When guests appear before a committee meeting, the committee may open such meetings, or a part of the meeting, to the press. A committee may also hold open meetings (which usually take the form of open hearings). Open meetings are broadcast on television and on the Althingi’s website and the results of committees’ work are published on the Althingi’s website. Parliamentary debates are invariably open to the public and are broadcast on television and the internet.

  • There is currently no code of conduct or ethics for members of the Althingi though one is being prepared . The only explicit rule which requires a member to exclude him or herself from voting (though not from participating in any debate on the matter) is with respect to any matter proposing a financial allocation to the member personally.  GRECO recommends (i) developing a code of conduct for members of the Althingi (MPs) and (ii) ensuring there is a mechanism both to promote the code and raise awareness among MPs on the standards expected of them, but also to enforce such standards where necessary. In addition, the existing rules and regulations on conflicts of interest, the acceptance of gifts and the disclosure of outside ties need to be further developed.
  • As indicated above there is only one legal rule requiring an MP to recuse him or herself from a vote, otherwise there is neither a general definition of conflicts of interest nor any specific guidance for MPs.  A particular issue and concern is  potential and perceived impact of personal and professional relationships on MPs in their public functions, particularly on whether and how ad hoc conflicts of interest should be declared and addressed as they arise in relation to an MPs’ parliamentary work. It is for these reasons, and to ensure that the members and the public can begin to properly monitor and determine when and how the interests of members may be perceived to influence the decision-making process, that GRECO recommends that the Althingi introduce a requirement of ad hoc disclosure when, in the course of parliamentary proceedings, a conflict between the private interests of individual MPs may emerge in relation to the matter under consideration. GRECO recommends that the existing registration system be further developed, in particular, (i) by including quantitative data of the financial assets/contributions received by MPs; (ii) by providing details of financial liabilities (i.e. debts) of MPs excluding reasonable house loans linked to ordinary market rates and minor loans not exceeding a reasonable limit; and (iii) by considering widening the scope of asset declarations to also include information on spouses and dependent family members (it being understood that such information would not necessarily need to be made public).
  • In light of the fierce public criticism of politicians in the wake of the collapse of Iceland’s banking system, it is incumbent on politicians themselves, to develop and promote a more open, transparent and considered ethos of ethics and self-responsibility that is supported by clear and simple rules and enforcement mechanisms. Thus, GRECO recommends that the Althingi strengthen the credibility of the registration system pertaining to MPs’ declarations of financial interests by ensuring greater adherence to the rules through a system of monitoring, providing MPs with access to advice and guidance, and implementing a mechanism to sanction MPs who fail to meet the requirements on them. In setting in place the recommended monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms due attention must be paid to their guarantees of independence and effectiveness.
  • There are no specific rules or guidance concerning the receipt of gifts, other than the applicable criminal law provisions on bribery namely Articles 128 and 109 of the General Penal Code. These provisions make it a criminal offence for a public official to demand or accept, or on any other person to give, promise or offer a public official, a gift or any other undue advantage in connection with the public official acting or refraining from acting in his or her official capacity. The punishment for such an offence is up to 6 years for the public official and 4 years for an individual. That said, one of the issues that was brought into sharper relief after the collapse of the banks was the way in which the lines may be, or have been, blurred between hospitality between “friends” – e.g. politicians and powerful members of the business community - and gifts that could be defined as creating a potential conflict of interest for someone in public office. So while gifts are included in MPs’ mandatory declarations, it is suggested that the Icelandic authorities give greater consideration, including consulting with MPs themselves, about whether the current thresholds for gifts adequately respond to some of these concerns. Likewise, it would appear that the current rules allow for a discretional interpretation of situations where gifts may or may not be reported by MPs since only gifts “that are given because of membership of Althingi” must be reported. This is an ambiguous formulation which opens up for possibilities to circumvent the mandatory reporting requirements.
  • There are no restrictions on MPs holding outside posts. Any state civil servant who is elected as an MP is considered to be on leave of absence – for up to five years – during his/her term of office if s/he does not choose to resign. If s/he decides to revert back to civil service after the expiry of his/her term as an MP, s/he is normally given priority in a comparable position to the one s/he left in the public sector. An exception to this is possible, by which an MP could be employed by the State or a State institution with a salary for that assignment of up to a maximum of 50% (sum to be decided by the responsible Ministry).
  • There are no prohibitions or restrictions on the holding of financial interests by MPs e.g. MPs who are owners within the fishing industry - one of Iceland’s main industries - for example, are not required to recuse themselves from voting on matters which could have a direct impact on their financial interests.
  • There are no prohibitions or restrictions on MPs entering into contracts with State authorities. The general legislation on public procurement is fully applicable in this context.
  • There are no regulations that would prohibit MPs from being employed in certain positions or in specific sectors upon expiry of their term of office. The particular concern expressed, as it applies to MPs, is the ease with which MPs have been able to move in and out of positions in the civil service, including sought-after positions in state institutions (and thus recruitment based on politics rather than merit), and then move to the private sector. Whereas a code of conduct has been developed for central government staff, a code of conduct for civil servants in general remains to be established. The Icelandic authorities are encouraged to pay attention to the issue of revolving doors – i.e. situations where public officials move to the private sector – and its specific regulation, including through the introduction of post-employment restrictions, particularly for high-level civil servants.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Add new comment