LEGISLATIVE LOBBYING AT THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEVEL

The committee stage of the legislative process begins when a proposal is received from the Commission and concludes when the committee adopts its final report. The committee’s formal rules divide the passage of legislation into three distinct phases, each of which provide lobbyists with particular opportunities to influence the final position. At each phase lobbyists and committee members alike are confronted with a new or revised legislative agenda. The agenda for the first phase is provided by the Commission’s legislative proposal. At this phase a Rapporteur prepares a ‘draft report’ on the proposal. By convention the Rapporteur is left to prepare the report in isolation from his legislative peers. The principal source of information available to the Rapporteur is drawn from the avalanche of information submissions made by organised interests, as well as by the more active national representations and regulators. The draft report together with the un-amended sections of the Commission’s proposal forms the agenda for the second ‘open amendment’ phase, where committee members (and other MEPs) are free to submit amendments. The third stage of the process is the compromise phase. More commonly referred to as the vote stage, this is the period when backroom deals are put together ahead of the final vote, often reducing the latter to a formality.

In common with standard information assumptions, committees seek to minimise their level of uncertainty over the outcome of their policy prescriptions. A failure to reduce uncertainty would clearly undermine a committee’s ability to achieve its policy goals. But it would also harm the committee’s reputation with the plenary, thereby reducing its future policy discretion and hence power. If uncertainty is minimised committees are free to conduct the transaction of ‘normal’ left/right politics, as well as a transparent trade in territorial demands. Uncertainty is reduced through the acquisition of private information on the consequences of policies.

The challenge for EP committees is to assess the implications of a considerable volume of legislative amendments submitted by committee members on behalf of lobbyists. This problem is heightened given that compared to national parliaments, the EP is considerably less resourced and has a legislative programme that is altogether more technical. Because the level of legislative complexity significantly exceeds the general level of committee member comprehension, committees respond to the threat of unforeseen policy implications through a form of sub-committee specialisation. This is far from a collective action but a consequence of individual actions, whereby influential members provide a level of scrutiny that lessens the likelihood of the committee adopting a technically deficient or overtly biased negotiating agenda. The result is that relatively small clusters of legislators are able to exert disproportionate control over a committee’s legislative output, and as such they represent the primary nodes for lobbying activity.

Their influence is part and parcel of their initial decision to become active , with their expertise honed on the job. This influence is felt across the full range of committee interactions, where they are able to provide a formidable level of advocacy for their own policy positions, and mount challenges to others. The forums for this activity include committee meetings before and after the draft report phase; compromise meetings during the compromise phase, and within party group meetings throughout the process. In addition they are more likely to occupy the formal party positions of shadow Rapporteur (if not Rapporteur) when they fall within their field of special interest, providing further opportunities to apply influence both within their own group and during the process of trialogue. [In Eurospeak, trialogues are “informal tripartite meetings attended by representatives of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission to try and forge compromises on often clashing positions].

In comparison, a committee member outside the influential set is less likely to have the capacity to undertake this form of advocacy; lacking the contextual knowledge and reputation to withstand the spotlight, which burns brighter for the outsider. Here direct participation in the process is often limited to faxing an amendment(s) to the secretariat. Their amendments tend to be successful when opposition from the more influential members is weakest, with party group coordinators and other office holders anxious to dispel accusations of cartel behaviour.

For the most part lobbyists aim to shape an aspect of a committee’s negotiating position. This may be in response to the Commission’s proposal, perhaps reflecting an earlier failure to convince, or in response to subsequent changes to the agenda. Essential to this process is the decision over which legislator(s) to lobby, and at what point in the process this should occur. But common across all lobbying communities is the hard wired operating mantra that: it is most advantageous to lobby at the earliest available point in the legislative process (framing the debate); lobby those with the most influence over the policy outcome; and lobby legislators that are likely to be sympathetic to your position (friends/allies), as opposed to the possibly counterproductive action of lobbying legislative foes. However, achieving the end goal of making the ‘message stick’ is of course partially contingent on the quality of the information, as it needs to be sufficiently compelling to motivate the target legislator.

When lobbyists seek to challenge the agenda set by the Commission, the formal procedures are such that on occasions lobbyists’ operating logic is challenged. The earliest point which influence can be applied in the formal committee process is at the draft report phase, but with agenda setting power concentrated in the hands of a single individual it is far from certain that the Rapporteur will be a legislative friend. Therefore if the lobbyist is faced with an unfriendly Rapporteur he will be forced to choose between the otherwise compatible logics of lobbying only his legislative allies or to follow the accepted wisdom amongst practitioners; that it is more effective to act early in a given legislative process than it is to attempt to change the terms of the debate later.

For lobbyists the cost of foregoing early participation is higher than the costs associated with lobbying a legislative foe. To an extent the costs more generally attributed to lobbying a foe are mitigated by the Rapporteur’s strategic incentive to incorporate certain otherwise disagreeable information into his report, in order to secure sufficient committee support To this effect lobbying a Rapporteur that is a legislative foe often takes place in the shadow of a later intervention by an influential legislative ally.

The second open amendment phase provides lobbyists with considerably more scope to influence a committee’s agenda. With the procedural bottleneck removed, lobbyists are free to seek advocacy from all committee members. The effect of this extension of direct legislative participation is that the provenance of an organised interest, although continuing to structure the set of available MEPs (legislative friends), for the most part ceases to limit the prospect of a lobbyist attaining legislative advocacy. However, with influential legislative friends applying an additional level of scrutiny lobbyists continue to face constraints, but in this case informal. It is never a problem to find a legislator to put forward an amendment but it is a different matter when it comes to finding one that is capable of convincing others to vote for it.

If a lobbyist does receive support from a legislator ‘capable of convincing others to vote’, they will willingly pay the additional informational costs associated with this form of advocacy. This is because the additional information is commensurate with the more active part that influential legislators play in advancing their position.

During the final compromise phase the role of new information is confined to reinforcing existing submissions or to counteracting changes to the agenda made during the previous phase. But in contrast to the previous phase, lobbyists are faced with a diminished pool of potential legislative allies. This is because the less influential members have faded from view, leaving negotiations to those better equipped. Therefore both courses of action are largely confined to lobbying influential friends. In the case of counteracting newly revealed opposing positions, this activity is contingent on a lobbyist locating a likeminded influential legislator to subsidise.

At the draft phase a lobbyist’s likelihood of achieving success is highest with a friendly Rapporteur [1]. If the Rapporteur is known to be a legislative foe, although suboptimal, he would nonetheless represent the next best option [2]. If unsuccessful at the draft report phase, lobbyists will continue to seek the incorporation of their message in the second open amendment phase. If the information is of sufficiently high quality an influential friend will be approached [(3)]. If the information is of insufficient quality or it is rejected, a non-influential friend will be sought out [(4)].

Legislative foes will not be approached in the second phase. If a lobbyist brings new information to the committee at the second phase, the process is identical to that for a first stage rejection; with the quality of the message determining which category of legislative friend will act as advocate; influential [1] or non-influential [2]. Third phase activity is confined exclusively to influential friends [1].