On June 5, 2008, the President of Russia put forward an initiative to develop a new pan-European security treaty, the main idea of which was to create – in the context of military and political security in the Euro-Atlantic region – a common undivided space in order to finally do away with the Cold War legacy.

It is useful to shed some light on the underlying points which drive Russia’s deep concerns. Moscow holds that the USSR was deceived on the issue of NATO expansion. At the same time, it is recognised that it was the fault of the Soviet leadership not to acquire legally binding guarantees at that time and the fault of the Russian leadership in the 1990s not to prevent NATO expansion per se. The current acrimony is caused by numerous examples of Western leaders making promises, blurred or straightforward, not to expand NATO further.

Agreements with Russia are theoretically possible on two key issues: non-expansion and non-deployment. But any such agreements will be of a political, not legally binding nature.

France and Germany have different but potentially complementary agendas with regard to Russia. While Paris is more interested in security-related questions, Berlin has focused more strongly on the realms of business and energy. However, German concerns about issues of European security are growing, and there is overlap in the problems facing economic actors from both countries in the Russian context.

Among international partners, Poland seems to reign in popularity sweepstakes, with the largest number of Ukrainians favouring partnership with it and Polish President Andrzej Duda topping the list of foreign leaders most trusted by Ukrainians.

Ukrainians have a demand for regional alliances with Ukraine’s participation, so Ukrainian diplomacy should continue this trend.

Ukrainians have lauded the development of

Ranking of total available active military power by country

The key military element of Minsk II is the disarmament of the separatists and the withdrawal of Russian “volunteer” forces, together with a vaguely worded suggestion for the temporary removal the Ukrainian armed forces (exclusive of border guards). The key political element consists of three essential and mutually dependent parts: demilitarization; a restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty, including control of the border with Russia; and full autonomy for the Donbas in the context of the decentralization of power in Ukraine as a whole.

As of September 2021 (in Billion U.S.$)

Resolution 2202 adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council endorses the February 12, 2015, Minsk Two agreement, titled Package of Measures for the Implementation of the September 2014 Minsk Agreements (Minsk One). The UN Security Council incorporates the Minsk Two document as an annex, thus conferring it further weight. This signifies an indirect endorsement of Minsk Two by the United States with the UN Security Council.