Actors directly controlled by or openly affiliated with Russian state

Russian state actors

  1. State officials’ appearances on/in traditional media programming /publications  (TV, Radio, Print)
  2. Official websites of Russian Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Defense
  3. Official government social media accounts
  4. State officials’ remarks, press conferences, other events (in-person attendees, and only when propagating messaging related to information efforts)

Russian domestic state-controlled media

  1. TV broadcasts and publications of state-owned newspapers in former Soviet states.
  2. Websites of Russian domestic state-controlled media
  3. Social media accounts of state-controlled domestic media organizations

Russian foreign-facing overtly state-controlled media

  1. TV programming, radio, and print media in foreign languages
  2. Websites of outlets such as RT, Sputnik, and Ruptly and associated streaming video channels
  3. Social media accounts associated with outlets like RT, Sputnik, and Ruptly, etc.

Actors with opaque ties to Russian state

Pro-Russian media with opaque ties to Russian state

  1. Other country traditional media outlets broadcasting content produced by Russian-state-controlled media
  2. Websites with opaque ties to the Russian state.
  3. Social media accounts of pro-Russian media outlets with opaque ties to Russian state

Nonmedia proxies with opaque ties to Russian state

  1. Websites with suspected links to Russian state that disseminate Russian messages or act as facilitators for Russian information; troll posts in comments sections of articles, images or videos.
  2. Social media account with opaque ties to Russian state conducting activities like posting, liking, purchasing ads, friend invites, rally organization on social media accounts, use of bots, etc./
  3. Proxy actors organizing rallies, ,and discussion forums, for causes in line with Russian interests.

Actors without known affiliation with Russian state

Pro-Russian nonmedia actors without affiliation to Russian state.

  1. Use of “unaffiliated” third parties to leak information
  2. Social media accounts of actors with no affiliation used to propagate pro-Russian messaging.
  3. Pro-Russian actors that disseminate pro-Russian messaging to audiences in person

Other country pro-Russian media without known affiliation to Russian state.

  1. Journalists an d pundits that propagate pro-Russian (or anti-Western ) messages on local TV an d radio and in newspapers.
  2. Media outlets’ websites that propagate pro-Russian (or anti-Western) messages and/or directly appropriate content from Russian state-controlled media outlets.
  3. Social media pages and posts operated by actors unaffiliated with the Russian state that propagate pro-Russian messages and/or directly appropriate content from Russian state controlled media outlets.

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